Executive compensation clawbacks operate on two fundamentally different foundations. One trigger is mandatory: under SEC rules adopted October 26, 2022, publicly traded companies must recover erroneously awarded incentive compensation after an accounting restatement, with no showing of executive fault required. The other two triggers—misconduct and reputational harm—are creatures of discretionary company policy, voluntarily adopted and defined by each board. Confusing the two regimes is a governance error, because the mandatory rule leaves no room for judgment, while discretionary policies succeed or fail on how carefully they are drafted and applied.
Understanding Executive Compensation Clawbacks: Mandatory vs. Discretionary Triggers
The SEC's final rules, adopted on October 26, 2022, require public companies to implement policies that recover erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation from current and former executive officers in the event of an accounting restatement. The rules stem from Section 10D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, added by Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and were first proposed in July 2015. Compensation received during the three-year period preceding a restatement falls within the recovery window.
That mandate is a floor, not a ceiling. Many companies layer additional triggers on top of it—fraud, misconduct, reputational harm, restrictive covenant breaches—through their own policies. Latham & Watkins, writing in October 2023, noted that existing policies may apply to a larger group of employees beyond current and former executive officers, allow recovery of compensation beyond the erroneously received portion, and include recoupment triggers beyond an accounting restatement, such as misconduct causing reputational harm. The distinction matters for boards: the mandatory rule is enforced by regulators and exchanges, while discretionary triggers are enforced only as far as the company's own policy language allows.




